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Abstract—Smart homes are a special use-case of the Internet-of-Things (IoT) paradigm. Security and privacy are two prime concern
in smart home networks. A threat-prone smart home can reveal lifestyle and behavior of the occupants, which may be a significant
concern. This article shows security requirements and threats to a smart home and focuses on a privacy-preserving security model.
We classify smart home services based on the spatial and temporal properties of the underlying device-to-device and owner-to-cloud
interaction. We present ways to adapt existing security solutions such as distance-bounding protocols, ISO-KE, SIGMA, TLS, Schnorr,
Okamoto Identification Scheme (IS), Pedersen commitment scheme for achieving security and privacy in a cloud-assisted home area
network.
Index Terms—Internet-of-Things, privacy, security, communication, smart home
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1 INTRODUCTION
The rapid growth of IoT is assisting humans in many
applications such as healthcare, transportation, entertainment,
industrial appliances, sport, building management, and homes.
Such IoT environments, while they provide unprecedented
opportunities, they raise significant security and privacy concerns.
This article focuses on smart homes and buildings in which a
variety of devices interact over the local network. Table 1 enlists
the typical devices in a home area network (HAN) along with
the underlying communication protocols. The device connectivity
in the HAN can be visualized as a star topology, where devices
connect to a central device controller. The device controller is
directly connected to the home router that provides connectivity
with the external traffic. The design of a HAN brings in many
challenges, as follows:
Device heterogeneity encompasses different embedded hardware,
operating systems, and user interfaces; e.g., HAN devices might be
installed with different operating systems such as Tiny OS (open
source), Contiki (open source), and RIOT (micro-kernel based).
Communication heterogeneity encompasses different
transmission medium protocols; e.g., different IoT specific
communication protocol adaptations such as Message Queuing
Telemetry Transport (MQTT), Constrained Application Protocol
(CoAP), User Datagram Protocol (UDP), and Transport Control
Protocol (TCP).
Technical expertise. Often, smart homeowners are not engineers
or security experts. Thus, most of the smart homeowners manually
actuate device interaction or to own a fully autonomous home.
Resource constraints and data collection. Most of the HAN
devices are lack of computational and storage power. In contrast,
HAN devices are a continuous source of data streaming. Hence,
one needs to store the data of all devices at one place (possibly
the cloud), which imposes secure and privacy-preserving data
collection and processing tasks.
Security and privacy. The HAN is susceptible to passive
monitoring over wireless channels, which may reveal potential
information regarding user interaction, behavior, lifestyle or
physical activity. We consider a privacy threat due to inference
attacks such that a homeowner might loose the control over
meta-information leakage about the user activity via channel
activity or device activity. The figure 1 shows the channel activity
for three home devices: CloudCam, Google Home, and Belkin
WeMo. The CloudCam shows a peak in the channel activity (up
to 400 KB/s traffic rate) as the user enters the home, moves inside
the home or exits the home. The Google Home shows a peak
in the channel activity (up to 250 KB/s traffic rate) whenever a
user initiated a voice command for the light bulbs to turn on/off.
Similarly, a bi-state WeMo switch peaks during the on state and
creates a channel activity lesser than 20 KB/s.
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Fig. 1: Traffic activity in correlation with user activity.
Undoubtedly, the autonomous layout among the home devices
would bring-in convenience. However, if the device interaction is
not secure, it would give away the home control to anyone closely
listening to the communication. At worse, even an adversary
located at a remote location can hijack the device session by
tampering with the external traffic. For example, a smart door lock
receives encrypted commands through mobile applications over
the wireless channel. If an adversary replays those commands used
in a session between the door lock and the mobile application, then
the door lock can be compromised through an identity mis-binding
attack. In this article, we restrict ourselves to a secure HAN
model for proximity-based communication. Below we discuss two
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2use-cases to show the need of security and privacy in HANs
beyond the naive solutions mentioned above.
Use-Case 1: Privacy. HAN devices are dependent and connected
such that controlling few devices would jeopardize the entire
HAN. Furthermore, device traffic sniffing can lead to user activity
inferences. The naive solution is to isolate the HAN from all types
of external traffic entering the home gateway and internal traffic
leaving the home gateway, though impractical. Another solution
is to use benign duping such that the group of devices inside a
home would simulate the owner activity, e.g., the owner is not in
the home, yet the lights would turn on/off periodically as if the
owner is at home. We provide privacy-preserving owner-to-cloud
interaction such that the cloud can verify the owners’ identity but
cannot infer the original identity.
Use-Case 2: Vandalism. The door locks, camera surveillance, and
motion detectors make a secure physical periphery of the home.
However, if these devices communicate through a public channel,
then an intruder might be able to first bypass the cyber-security of
these devices, and then the physical periphery of the home. Hence,
it is required to secure the HAN device connectivity for the overall
secure automation.
This article studies security protocols for device-to-device
(D2D) and owner-to-cloud (O2C) interactions in HANs. The
device interaction is classified as per the proximity communication
model that utilizes spatial and temporal attributes to perceive the
security requirements. We provide a brief glance through existing
security protocols for each of these proximity communication
scenarios.
Related work. Smart homes are a combination of different
standards: IEEE P2413 Internet of Things defines the
Internet-enabled device communication with the assistance of
infrastructure. IEEE 1888.4 Green Smart Homes defines the smart
home paradigm from energy resource management perspective.
IEEE 1547 Smart Grid Integration defines how to connect
distributed renewable energy resources with the smart grid. IEEE
2030 defines how to interoperate various smart grid technologies.
IEEE 1901 defines an infrastructure using broadband over power
line. IEEE 2302 Intercloud Interoperability defines new means
of intercloud connectivity. However, there is no standard security
specification for smart home networks.
Currently, the smart home communication consists of a set of
autonomous devices capable of sensing and conducting actions.
There exists a study about the social barrier into adoption of
home networks [1]. User [2] can also send commands or trigger a
self-executing order [3] for these devices from a remote location.
Overall, the smart home communication so far is visualized as a
network component that executes commands based on contextual
factors as well as overriding the contextual commands with the
priority commands from the smart home owner. To the best of our
knowledge, none of the work [4], [5] highlight the significance of
secure ordering inside smart homes much similar to non-digital
homes. We highlight the presence of a pattern among smart home
devices such that a partial ordering on device activity is observed
on daily basis. Usually, devices perform actions during similar
hours and along with similar logically neighbouring devices over
the digital timeline in IoT homes. The authors in [5] have
presented a privacy-preserving traffic shaping scheme to mask
the channel activity and thereby the device or user activity at
the ISP level. According to the scheme, if the shaped traffic
rate is lower than the device traffic then the packets are queued,
and if the shaped traffic rate is higher than the device traffic
then dummy packets are added to cover the original traffic rate
variations. However, these techniques do not avoid the inferences
on device activity pattern due to the straightforward binding
between the channel activity and device activity. Our scheme
decouples the channel activity from the device activity such that a
communication activity over the channel at any given time cannot
be coupled with a specific device activity or the user activity.
There exists a number of IoT frameworks [6], [7] based on
a general model that includes IoT devices, backend cloud and
a proxy gateway. These frameworks support a variety of IoT
devices from the vendors such as Amazon, Samsung, Google,
Philips Hue, Nest, Belkin and others, therefore, the connectivity
requirements aka communication protocols vary in each of these
framework scenario. Here, we provide a brief overview of these
IoT frameworks and the security layer within:
Apple HomeKit: This IoT framework is dedicated to smart home
device connectivity. It leverages the connectivity for IoT home
appliances and accessories through smartphone iOS apps. The
iOS app Home allows the devices to join/leave home network,
customize, and control the home environment. It must be noted
that an owner can choose actions for IoT devices through Siri
service in Homekit, however, it is still not possible to schedule
the device actions in advance as we propose in this paper. In
the HomeKit architecture IoT devices connect to the platform
either directly or through proxy gateways that supports ZigBee
and Z-Wave communication protocols. However, the IoT devices
that directly connects through HomeKit accessory protocol can
communicate through LAN, WiFi or BLE instead of ZigBee and
Z-wave transport protocols. For example, tvOS 10 supports the
Homekit framework and acts like a hub for IoT home devices
and a home owner can access these device from a remote
location through iOS app. The security layer in Homekit includes
Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS) and secure communication
over Transport Layer Security (TLS) or Datagram TLS with
AES128-GCM, AES256 and SHA256. The PFS ensures that any
future communication is secure and the leakage of long-term keys
in future cannot reveal the sessions from past. In addition, the
applications’ access to home data is based on permission-model
and the iOS system data is secure against memory-based attacks
through Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) technique.
Amazon Web Service (AWS): This IoT platform provides a
ubiqutous connectivity between the IoT devices and the AWS
cloud. The AWS architecture includes: (a) device gateway
providing connectivity among IoT devices and the cloud services
through MQTT (Message Queue Telemetry Transport), SSL
(Secure Socket Layer), TLS, Websockets and HTTP (Hyper Text
Transfer Protocol) 1.1; (b) device shadows maintaining a virtual
replica of the original device also keep synchronizing the device
state. In case a device is offline the device shadow retains the
last visible state of the device and all pending upgrades can be
restored once the device is online; (c) rule engine providing
a policy execution on the published data and transforming it
into subscriber-appropriate format; (d) registry maintaining the
meta-level information (e.g., device name, identity, vendor, other
attributes, etc) about connected devices. The security architecture
of AWS includes authentication based on X.509 certificates,
confidentiality through SSL/TLS based secure key exchange,
access control through policy specification, forward secrecy
through TLS cipher suites such as AES128-GCM-SHA256,
ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256, and,
3Usage Example devices Communication
protocols
Scenarios
Voice-based
smart
assistants
Alexa, Amazon Echo, Lenovo Smart Assistant, Eufy
Genie (far-field Alexa control), iHome iAVS 16, HTC
U11,
BLE, WiFi,
ZigBee, Z-Wave
D2DWL (Alexa: what is the
morning traffic status?)
Healthcare Zio XT Patch, HealthPatch MD, Sleep monitors BLE, WiFi D2DWL (Alexa: How much did I
walk or sleep today?)
Lightening Lutron-Sivoia QS Shading System/Caseta Pro Dimmer,
Philips-Hue Bloom/Lightstrip Plus,
BLE, WiFi,
ZigBee, Z-Wave
D2DW, D2DWL (Alexa: Put the
shades on enough intensity for
reading/watching TV/eating.)
Door locks Schlage Connect Touchscreen Deadbolt, Ring Doorbell
Pro
Cellular, WiFi,
ZigBee, Z-Wave
D2DWL (Alexa: Who is at the
door?)
HVAC
systems
ecobee4 Thermostat BLE, WiFi,
ZigBee, Z-Wave
D2DWL (Alexa: Is it more humid
today?)
Controllers Amazon Echo, Amazon Echo Dot, ARRIS SURFboard
router (1750Mbps wireless speed, 1.4Gb download
speed, gigabit ethernet), ASUS Blue Cave (based on
Intel), Belkin WeMo Mini, Logitech Harmony Remote
(use with Alexa, upto 15 devices)
WiFi, ZigBee,
Z-Wave
D2DW, D2DWL (Alexa: Put
lights on daylight bright, music
on quite, microwave on grill
mode, washing machine on dry
mode.)
Hygiene SteriGrip self-cleaning door handles, Unico smartbrush WiFi, Cellular D2DWL (Alexa: Restore my
Unico timer and brush rotation
speed.)
Remote
surveillance
Logitech Circle 2, Amazon Echo Show WiFi, Cellular D2DW, D2DWL (Alexa: Show
me who came at the door between
9am to 5pm?)
Smart meters Itron, Elster, Landis+Gyr/Toshiba, Aclara, ABB and
Sensus Metering Systems
WiFi, ZigBee,
Z-Wave
D2DW, D2DWL (Alexa: Tell me
the peak power consumption on
hours/days/weeks?)
Smart dust Vehicle keyfob, eco-cooking tools, smart gardening
tools, and wild life saver
Bluetooth, WiFi D2DWL (Alexa: Keep the smart
dust in low-power mode when
not in use.)
Entertainment Sonos Play: 1, Sonos Playbar, Amazon Fire TV, Sony
XBR TV, DISH Hopper 3,
WiFi, ZigBee,
Z-Wave
D2DW, D2DWL (Alexa: Play my
morning mantra playlist.)
Notations: BLE: Bluetooth Low Energy, D2DWL: Device-to-Device Wireless, D2DW: Device-to-Device Wired.
TABLE 1: Smart home devices and underlying communication protocols.
AES256-GCM-SHA384.
Samsung SmartThings: This IoT platform is dedicated to smart
home environments and appliance connectivity through mobile
phone apps. The SmartThing framework is composed of a
cloud backend, controller hub, mobile client app, and the IoT
devices. The controller hub interacts with the home devices
and the cloud services. The hub provides connectivity through
several communication protocols such as ZigBee, Z-Wave,
WiFi, and BLE. In addition, the cloud-connected devices utilize
OAuth/OAuth2 protocol for authentication and SSL/TLS for
message transmission. In addition, the hub supports AES-128
bit encryption for all communication with ZigBee and Z-Wave
enabled products.
Azure IoT Suite: This IoT platform includes IoT devices, cloud
services and hub to provide secure connectivity. The cloud is
entitled to send commands and notifications for the IoT devices
through the hub. The hub supports MQTT and HTTP protocols to
enable this bi-directional connectivity. The security layer provides
device authentication, access control and communication security.
The device authentication is based on HMAC-SHA256 signed
token along with the unique device identity. The access control
and authorization is based on permission policies defined in the
Azure Active Directory. The SSL/TLS protocol is used for secure
handshake, mutual authentication, and session secrecy.
There exists other frameworks such as IBM Watson IoT
platform, Brillo/Weave platform by Google, Calvin IoT platform
by Ericsson, ARM mbed IoT platform, Kura IoT project by
Eclipse, interested readers may refer [7] for more details.
2 SECURITY THREATS AND GOALS
Existing HANs are vulnerable to a variety of active and passive
attacks. Table 2 presents a taxonomy on these threats. Below we
provide an overview of the basic security requirements necessary
for the proximity-based communication scenarios in the HAN.
• Authentication: confirms identities of participants and provides
an evidence to each participant as to whom they are
communicating with. Digital signatures, secure identity
transmission, physically-unclonable functions (PUF), and secure
key exchanges are viable solutions for authentication.
• Authorization: grants privileges to an authenticated user.
Fine-grained policy management and different access-control
methods are used to provide access-rights.
• Confidentiality: hides the messages from an adversary and reveal
to an authorized user only. Encryption, secret-sharing, traffic
4Attacks Purpose Scenario Channel Security
compromise
Techniques
Existing passive attacks
Eavesdropping/
Side-channel
Scanning all the communication channels to know
information of participants and their behavior.
D2DWL (e.g., sleep monitor activity reveals whether the
user is awake or not?)
WiFi,
ZigBee,
Z-Wave,
Availability,
confidentiality
Traffic shaping,
padding
Repeater-in-the
-Middle,
Replay
Amplification or retransmission of wireless signals
from past
D2DW, D2DWL (e.g., vehicle-to-keyfob, where keyfob
thinks it connects to a parked vehicle while a repeater in
the middle apmlify the signal way too early and gets access
to the vehicle )
WiFi,
ZigBee,
Z-Wave
Authentication,
integrity
Out-of-band
or multi-factor
authentication
Existing active attacks
Jamming,
evasion,
spoofing
Overwhelms the network resources and makes
them inaccessible to legit users
D2DWL (e.g., in the presence of traffic congestion at same
frequency and shared bandwidth channel such that devices
are unable to connect with the smart meter)
WiFi,
ZigBee,
Z-Wave
Availability Topology
and neighbor
discovery
Man-in-the
-Middle
Actively engaging with two devices such that at
least one of them cannot see the adversary in
middle
D2DW, D2DWL (e.g., a mobile application connects with
the paired door lock while actually connecting with a
standby middle adversary and vice-versa)
LAN,
WiFi,
ZigBee,
Z-Wave
Authentication Identification
Identity
misbinding
Active attack on two devices in interaction such
that one of these authentic device establish key
with the active adversary
D2DW, D2DWL (e.g., closing the door lock with a mobile
application where mobile app connects with the door lock
but the door lock connects with an active adversary and
thereby follow the fabricated commands)
LAN,
WiFi
Authentication Identification
Repudiation Ability to disown the communication transcripts
or the identities used for communication
D2DW, D2DWL (e.g., Alice leaving no traces of her
original identity while she opened the door lock with Bob’s
password)
LAN,
WiFi,
ZigBee,
Z-Wave
Non-repudiation,
identification
Signature or
certificate-based
identification
Tampering Ability to reveal or modify the secret messages D2DW, D2DWL (e.g., Alice requesting smart meter to send
power usage while she receives power usage of previous
months added with the current usage)
LAN,
WiFi,
ZigBee,
Z-Wave
Confidentiality,
integrity
Escrowing,
auditable proofs
Denial of
services (DoS)
Malicious users overwhelm the network resources
and makes them inaccessible to other legitimate
users
D2DWL (e.g., Alexa reacting first to the user who is closer
and therefore, the user who is a little farther would not be
able to reach Alexa and receive the response)
WiFi,
ZigBee,
Z-Wave
Availability Neighbor
discovery
Reflection
attacks
Initiator device ends up establishing a secure
communication with itself
D2DW, D2DWL (e.g., keyfob seems synchronize and ping
car window but car window does not seem to follow the
command and open up)
LAN,
WiFi,
ZigBee,
Z-Wave
Authentication,
forward secrecy
Multi-factor
authentication
Routing table
attacks
Aimlessly roaming messages in the network
without a path validation mechanism
D2DW, D2DWL (e.g., home controller cannot find a few
indoor devices on the network topology and therefore,
cannot connect with them even if located very closely)
LAN,
WiFi,
ZigBee,
Z-Wave
Confidentiality,
integrity
On-the-fly path
validation
Firewall
piercing
Bypassing the security mechanism and the ability
to establish a covert channel
D2DW, D2DWL (e.g., secret identification of the sender
device based on a clock-skewness pattern in the outgoing
TCP/ICMP messages)
LAN,
WiFi,
ZigBee,
Z-Wave
Authentication,
integrity
Digital
watermarking,
fingerprinting,
intrusion
detection
Destructive
attacks
Randomly switching on/off the devices, disrupting
indoor temperature, sound settings, breaking water
outlets
D2DWL (e.g., ability to access the devices for maintenance
and to disrupt the settings knowingly)
LAN,
WiFi,
ZigBee,
Z-Wave
Authorization Privacy-
preserving
communication
Key
compromise
Revealing the static/ephemeral key to impersonate
user identity (e.g., Alice compromise the master
key of digital-home crypto-key store and change
all other keys)
D2DW, D2DWL (e.g., social engineering attacks to deceive
the user into revealing the keys)
LAN,
WiFi,
ZigBee,
Z-Wave
Forward
secrecy,
backward
secrecy,
adaptive
secrecy
Key escrow,
secret key shares,
ephemeral keys
New attacks in smart environment
Application
compromise
Installing a malware for man-in-middle, id-based
or combination of attacks, compromising other
connected devices and sensitive data, transferring
fake data
D2DWL (e.g., Alice login to a bank website and during
logout an active adversary blocks the finish message and
proper session termination)
All
external
traffic
Authentication,
confidentiality,
integrity
Memory
partitioning,
middleware
approach
OS
compromise
Exploit available memory/data of devices,
unauthorized access, double-pricing
O2C (e.g., Meltdown, Heartbleed and other information
leakage attacks during process execution)
Trojans,
malware
Authentication,
confidentiality
Secure
co-processors,
Intel SGX
Cloud
compromise
Attacks on clouds, virtual machines,
communications between the HAN gateway
and the cloud; revealing data/computations at
cloud
O2C (e.g., Data access pattern attacks) LAN,
WiFi,
ZigBee,
Z-Wave
Authentication,
confidentiality,
integrity,
non-repudiation,
availability
Proxy-
reencryption,
homomorphic
encryption
Location
compromise
GPS spoofing, distance-attacks D2DWL, O2C (e.g., using fabricated pseudorandom noise
codes)
BLE,
WiFi,
Cellular
Pre-shared keys Anonymity,
unlinkability,
unobservability
Social
networking
These attacks focus on breaking at least one
device containing user sensitive data by fake
apps, plug-ins, offers, click hijacking, botnets, and
impersonation and then gradually increasing the
overall influence, e.g., sybil attacks
D2DW, D2DWL (e.g., by stealing devices and pin codes) LAN,
WiFi,
ZigBee,
Z-Wave
Confidentiality Plausible
deniability,
anonymity
Evil-twin A fake access point mimicking an authentic
Service Set Identifier (SSID)
D2DWL (e.g., a standalone access point deceiving users to
connect through it and then launching other attacks such as
packet sniffing)
WiFi Authentication,
confidentiality,
integrity,
availability
Wireless/device
fingerprinting
TABLE 2: Existing and new security attacks in the HAN.
5padding, zero-knowledge proofs, proof-of-knowledge, group
signatures, pseudonym systems provide confidentiality.
• Integrity: assures the correctness and consistency of the
identity and messages. Cryptographic hashing, watermarking,
holographic proofs, multi-party computations, timestamping,
nonce, and sequence numbers are used to maintain integrity.
• Availability: guarantees fair operations, resources, and services
to an authorized user. Anomaly detection, firewalls, and special
communication hardware preventing external malicious traffic to
reach the network are techniques for achieving fairness.
• Non-repudiation: prevents either a sender or a receiver from
denying a transmitted message or a protocol execution. Digital
signatures are commonly used to provide non-repudiation.
• Accountability or auditing: is a process of bookkeeping each
step at the sender, the receiver, or the network, so that a judge or
a participant can verify the transactions in future.
• Deniability: The deniable communication empowers a prover
to plausibly deny that a protocol instance was ever executed,
for which the same prover was an active participant. Therefore,
even if all protocol transcripts are stored for later analysis, it
does not suffice as an identification-proof for a specific prover
that participated during the protocol.
• Unlinkability: A user might utilize multiple pseudonyms for
authentication regarding different services, however, this must
not yield a linking between any two pseudonyms used by the
same homeowner for two different services.
• Non-transferability: A homeowner has unique privileges over
the HAN. For example, only one unique administrator account
is the highest privileged on a standalone computer. Thus, the
non-transferability over these privileges is crucial to retain the
ownership. This property avoids credential forgery and the user
identity attacks.
• Forward secrecy: In order to enable temporal security for
cryptographic credentials perfect forward secrecy [8] is crucial.
Forward secrecy guarantees that a session key derived from a
long-term public-private key pair is secure even if one of the
(long-term) private keys are compromised in the future.
• Privacy: The privacy is inherent in establishing and maintaining
the HAN because the most economic attack is to do passive
learning and gain side-channel information without even
breaking the lengthy keys and complex hash codes. Essentially,
D2D communication should be able to protect the privacy
through hiding: user activity, behavior pattern, device activity
patterns.
3 LIGHTWEIGHT CRYPTOGRAPHIC SOLUTIONS
This section presents ways to incorporate existing lightweight
cryptographic solutions for HANs. The HAN consists of
computational and storage inefficient devices (e.g., door locks,
coffee machines, thermostats) that receive on/off commands
vs resource-abundant complex devices (e.g., smart meters,
voice-based assistants) that additionally collect data, trigger
alarms, inform the owner about device state or any resource
shortage. These devices interact with each other using different
communication protocols, as explained in Table 1. Thus,
the HAN would require a combination of security protocols
based on symmetric keys, asymmetric keys, Authenticated
Key Exchange (AKE), reactive authentication, out-of-band
authentication, or privacy aware identification. Our selection of
these adapted protocols guarantees security properties such as
secrecy, integrity, confidentiality, authentication, authorization,
accountability, forward secrecy, non-transferability, unlinkability,
and plausible deniability.
Lightweight: Our discussion below is limited to lightweight
cryptographic protocols [9] to support secure D2D interactions
in HAN wherein devices are connected to and controlled by a
central controller over a WiFi network. The protocols execute
over cheap commodity hardware with limited processing power,
memory, and communication bandwidth as is the case with
current IoT devices. We note that the future may support a
more decentralized device architecture wherein home devices may
execute more autonomously (e.g., a washing machine (in order to
reduce cost) may exploit the dynamic pricing model of resources
such as water and electricity) and use data payment protocols
using cryptocurrency that require proof-of-mining and consume
larger processor, memory-usage, and communication.
3.1 Proximity Model
The proximity communication model in a HAN can be envisioned
on two dimensions: space and time, as follows:
Timeline. The notion of the timeline is to incorporate
communication activity of every pair/group of devices under the
same roof. In addition, each device shares its local timeline with a
peer device. The time representation for device activation requires
a dependency relation among those devices. Moreover, it would be
easier to represent how much time and energy resources a device
spends in communication with other devices. Consequently, these
devices and groups can be merged into a single virtual node as
they stand adjacent on the timeline.
Space. The notion of space considers spatial aspects of digital
devices in the HAN. The spatial arrangement of smart devices is
another important dimension to create a virtual node. In addition
to the devices that spend most of the time in communication with
a specific device, there exist devices that interact less frequently.
However, these devices share the spatial locality.
The device interaction can be categorized based on space and
time, as follows:
• Same Time and Same Space: These are an indoor group
of devices that share an identical timeline and the location.
These devices would require wireless communication such
as Bluetooth, infrared, wireless LAN, ZigBee, and Z-Wave.
This scenario can be adapted with the existing out-of-band
verification methods to guarantee multi-factor authentication.
We briefly discuss the out-of-band verification protocols for
these devices, e.g., distance-bounding.
• Same Time and Different Space: These are an outdoor
group of devices that share the common timeline but different
geographical locations. These devices would require wired or
cellular (e.g., LTE) based connectivity. This scenario can be
adapted with the existing secure key exchange protocols to
guarantee per-session security. We briefly discuss the security
protocols ISO-KE, SIGMA, and TLS for these devices.
• Different Time and Different Space: This use-case requires
the homeowner interaction with a third-party service provider
located at a distance. These interactions include service
registration, activation, computation, and termination. This
scenario can be adapted with privacy-preserving identification
and access delegation protocols that assure security features
(e.g., non-transferability, unlinkability, and deniability). These
solutions provide control over the identification such that
6committed values can be revealed to a verifier in future and
the right to reveal that secret information is uniquely held by
the owner only. We briefly discuss Schnorr [10] and Okamoto
IS, Pedersen bit-commitment protocol, proxy re-encryption, and
homomorphic encryption approaches for these scenarios.
• Different Time and Same Space: This use-case requires
scheduling protocols [3] such that devices receive an actuation
token, perform computation, produce results, and pass the token
to next device in the queue. In [11] we present a new verifiable
delay scheme that allows an unpredictable amount of artificial
delay before the command actuation at any home device. In
particular, our solution provides improved privacy guarantees
over naive solutions that require command pre-scheduling at
these IoT devices.
3.2 Key Generation
The general methods for secure key management are key
pre-sharing, key evolution, and PUF-enabled key-store. In key
pre-sharing techniques, a set of potential keys are pre-shared with
devices. Each device shares a subset of pre-shared keys and the
common intersection of those subsets is used to generate the future
session keys.
The key evolution methods generate a symmetric key or a
pair of asymmetric keys for each device. The symmetric key
solutions require two devices to share a bi-directional static
secret key that encrypts/decrypts messages at both devices.
As an advantage, the symmetric key solutions require the
minimum number of exponentiation per device than asymmetric
key solutions. However, this computation efficiency comes
with a vulnerability to key compromise attacks. In contrast,
the asymmetric-key-based protocols provide additional security
features such as non-repudiation, fewer number of keys to be
stored, and the secure storage on insecure media. In addition, key
evolution provides methods to frequently change the secret keys
while the corresponding public key remains unchanged.
In PUF secured key-store, all secret keys and pre-shared keys
are stored in a single key-storage, however, this key-storage is
accessible only through a master secret key. Therefore, PUF can be
used to secure these secret master keys without explicitly storing
the master key on a storage media. Therefore, it avoids the key
extraction attacks through physically access to the device storage.
We assume a smart home scenario consists of n home devices
(D1, D2, . . . , Dn) and an owner O. D2D communication (wired
or wireless communication channel) must be augmented with
secure sessions. A secure session key agreement requires that
communicating parties share a long-term static secret and use a
new ephemeral secret for each session. Also, a secure session
must begin with the validation of static credentials, i.e, who
has generated, distributed and revoked the authentic credentials.
A trusted-third-party, called Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) or
Key Generation Center (KGC), e.g., Kerberos system, is used to
manage these master keys.
We classify device communication into three
categories: device-to-device wireless (D2DWL) connectivity,
device-to-device wired (D2DW) connectivity, and owner-to-cloud
(O2C) connectivity. The classification of these use-cases is
derived from time-space analogy defined earlier.
3.3 Device-to-Device Wireless (D2DWL) Connectivity
The same time and same space based proximity model is
applicable in D2DWL, because the device interaction through a
wireless channel in a close proximity is less vulnerable to security
breaches than a device interaction at a remote location. Home
to parking (vehicle/keyfob), home to irrigation controllers, home
to garbage bins, and home to surveillance unit are examples
of D2DWL. For securing D2DWL, a reactive authentication
or out-of-band verification methods can be used. The reactive
authentication method combines (i) static attributes (e.g., a secret
key, hardware-based challenge-response verification using PUF,
wireless fingerprinting, time-space localization — triangulation,
trilateration, multilateration, and distance-bounding [12]); and (ii)
dynamic attributes (e.g., the user behavior or the anthropomorphic
features including biometrics, gait, voice, and typing patterns) —
for generating a random challenge for which only an authentic
entity can generate the paired response. We briefly explain the
security adaptations based on the distance-bounding protocols.
Distance-bounding: Location is a unique attribute for verifiable
service access such as providing building access only when
the user possesses right magnetic token and the user is close
enough to the door. We chose distance-bounding protocol that
verifies authentic credentials along with the proximity estimation
over wireless channels. The distance-bounding protocols infer an
upper bound on the distance between a sender and a receiver
by measuring the round-trip time (RTT) of signals. In general,
these protocols use n rounds for accurate distance estimation
by exchanging unique challenge-response pairs between a sender
and a receiver. A sender forwards a unique challenge to an
intended recipient within the proximity. Then, the receiver receives
the challenge and computes the paired response using a trusted
hardware or a shared hash function. The sender will receive this
response and check the validity of response such that no older
response has been replayed. Now, the sender can estimate the
distance of the party sending the correct response by knowing
(i) RTT: the interval when the challenge was sent to recipient and
the corresponding response was received, (ii) measuring the time
while radio signal traversing at the speed of light. Consequently,
an estimate distance is computed such that no sender farther than
the estimated distance could have transmitted the signals without
incurring an additional delay over the current estimation.
3.4 Device-to-Device Wired (D2DW) Connectivity
The same time and different space based proximity model is
applicable in D2DW, because the wired communication is secure
for long distance interactions in real-time. For example, device
connectivity with the smart meters, smart grid, broadband over
power line (IEEE 1901) etc. In D2DW, the security can be
achieved using either a symmetric key (e.g., Needham Schroeder
symmetric key protocol) or asymmetric keys (e.g., AKE,
non-interactive Diffie-Hellman, PKI based ISO-KE, SIGMA,
TLS/SSL, NAXOS, HMQV, CMQV protocol). We present the
asymmetric key based solutions, namely ISO-KE, SIGMA, and
TLS protocols using Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange.
In Diffie-Hellman algorithm, all computations are done within
a cyclic group G = 〈g〉 of a prime order q, where Computational
Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption holds. The CDH assumption
satisfies that the computation of a Discrete Logarithm (DL)
function on public values (g, ga, gb) is hard [13] within group
G.
Computational Diffie-Hellman. Let 〈g〉 be a cyclic group G
generated by an element g of order q. There is no efficient
7probabilistic algorithm ACDH that given (g, ga, gb) produces
gab , where a, b are chosen as random group elements.
ISO-KE protocol adaptation: According to ISO-KE (Figure 2a),
the sender device Di initializes a secure key exchange by sending
its certificate, Cert i, and a DH exponent, gx, to a receiver, Dj
(STEP 1). After the certificate identity verification, Dj responds
to Di with its own certificate, Certj , and its DH exponent, gy .
However, in order to avoid any misbinding/reflection attacks, Dj
concatenates the credentials of the intended recipient Di, i.e.,
Signj(g
x, gy,Cert i) (STEP 2). Di responds with the signature
on mutually agreed values, i.e., Signi(g
x, gy, Certj) (STEP
3). The session key is derived from gxy . However, note that
the ISO-KE protocol does not support identity hiding, since
certificates are transferred in plaintexts.
SIGMA protocol adaptation: SIGMA supports sender and
recipient identity hiding feature unless the identity of the opposite
device is successfully verified. In this protocol, the DH key
exchange is authenticated through digital signature, and the device
identity is encrypted using a freshly driven key (Ke) to protect the
identity against eavesdropping.
When adapting SIGMA protocol in a HAN (Figure 2b), a
device Di sends DH exponent gx to an intended recipient Dj
(STEP 1). On receiving gx, Dj computes its exponent gy and the
corresponding session key gxy . Then, gxy is used to generate three
different and computationally independent keys, i.e., a session
key (Ks), an encryption key (Ke), and a message authentication
key (Km). Dj forward an encrypted message with the exponent
gy , signed exponents (gx, gy), and the Message Authentication
Code (MAC) over identity j (STEP 2). The protocol terminates
after Di verifies the signed exponents and the identity from Dj
and computes the corresponding session key gxy . In addition, Di
forwards an encrypted message with the signed exponents (gx, gy)
and the MAC over identity i (STEP 3).
As an advantage, this protocol has the minimal number
of message exchange than any key exchange protocol does to
prevent replay attacks. Figure 2b shows a 3-round version of
SIGMA protocol with the prover identity protection as a required
feature. Similarly, there also exists a 4-round version of SIGMA
that provides verifiers’ identity protection. Whenever the indoor
home network devices do not want to reveal the identity before
verifying the identity of a peer device/service in long-distance
communication, then the SIGMA protocol would be preferred over
ISO-KE protocol.
Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol adaptation: TLS
is a widely accepted standard for Internet security (Figure 2c).
TLS handshakes are based on a pre-defined sequence of phases:
mutual authentication, random secret exchange, session key
establishment, and finish. The handshake between a deviceDi and
a server S starts by sending Hello messages that include supported
range of cryptographic standards called cipher-suite (STEP 1 and
STEP 2). Also, the mutual authentication is accomplished through
authority signed certificates in a Certificate Exchange message
(STEP 2 and STEP 3). Di sends session key to server S along
with its certificate in (STEP 3). Also, Di sends a finish message to
acknowledge the beginning of ciphered communication (STEP 4).
Similarly, S sends a finish message to acknowledge the beginning
of ciphered communication (STEP 5). Afterward, Di and S switch
to the symmetric key encryption-based communication using
the recently established session key to encrypt and decrypt the
message exchange.
Comparisons. SIGMA protocol is preferred for the applications
where privacy is crucial along with an end-to-end session security.
SIGMA protocol provides identity-hiding features which are
neither part of ISO-KE nor TLS. In addition, SIGMA protocols
can be chosen either for sender identity-protection (3-rounds) or
for receiver identity-protection (4-rounds).
3.5 Owner-to-Cloud (O2C) Connectivity
The different time and different space based proximity model is
considered in O2C, because the data produced by devices in a
home is often stored at a different space, particularly, the public
cloud at a different time, due to some processing at the home and
the network transmission delay.
Some home devices send data to cloud, and this data needs to
be accessed in a privacy-preserving manner. Though encrypting
the data at the cloud, accessing encrypted data at the cloud
can reveal users’ privacy of the user. For example, if the user
data is accessed by a cancer hospital, then by access-patterns
and background knowledge, an adversary can reveal medical
conditions of the user without knowing the encrypted data and
users’ identity. Hence, the ease of using cloud services comes
with threats to the data and user privacy, and it brings two main
challenges:
1) Secure storage and query processing to prevent the cloud
to learn user’s activities, through usage-patterns or query
processing on the data. Hence, data storage and query
processing at the cloud must be cryptographically secure
using techniques, such as encryption or secret-sharing.
2) Secure authentication provides a way to securely authenticate
the homeowner at the cloud. For this purpose, we illustrate
Schnorr and Okamoto IS executing between the homeowner
and the cloud. Despite having a secure connection between
the cloud and the homeowner, the cloud can still reveal
the proof of communication that can be avoided using
secure commitment protocols. Bit-commitment protocols are
based on commitment-before-knowledge paradigm and can
be used for a private proof of identity possession in HAN.
A bit-commitment protocol incorporates a commit phase and
a reveal phase such that committed value is revealed only
if the DL condition satisfies. We illustrate an adaptation of
Pedersen commitment protocol in HAN.
Schnorrs’ Identification Scheme: The scheme is based on the
intractability of DL problem. According to the protocol, an
owner O as identity prover selects a secret DH exponent x and
releases a corresponding public value X for the verifier cloud
C . Consequently, the verifier cloud returns a challenge µ for the
identity proving owner. Now the prover generates a combined
response ρ such that it is computationally hard to compute ρ
without possessing the knowledge of x. Furthermore, there exist
multiple variations to regular Schnorr like IS. For example, one
possible way [14] is to replace ρ with ρˆ, i.e., gˆx+a∗µ where
gˆ = H(X|µ) is the new generator such that the IS remains robust
against the ephemeral key leakage.
Common inputs are (p, q, g,G) where p, q are large prime
numbers, g is the generator of order q in group G.
Keygen(pk,sk): sk = a ∈ Zq and pk = ga = A. The protocol
Γ(O,C) steps for the prover O(a,A) and the verifier C(A) are
given below:
• Prover selects x ∈ Zq at random in Schnorr’s group and
computes X = gx ∈ G.
8Di Dj
(STEP1) Certi,gx−−−−−−−−−−→
(STEP2) Certj ,gy,Signj(gx,gy,Certi)←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
(STEP3) Signi(gy,gx,Certj)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
(a) ISO-KE adaptation.
Di Dj
(STEP1) gx−−−−−−→
(STEP2) gy,EKe (j,Signj(g
x,gy),MACKm (j))←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
(STEP3) EKe (i,Signi(g
x,gy),MACKm (i))−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
(b) SIGMA protocol adaptation.
Di S
(STEP1)Hello(version,compatibility)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
(STEP2)Hello(version,compatibility),CertS ,RequestCerti←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Verify CertS
(STEP3) Session keyPKS ,Certi−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Verify Certi
(STEP4) FinishDi−−−−−−−−−−−→
(STEP5) FinishS←−−−−−−−−−−
(c) TLS adaptation.
Fig. 2: ISO-KE, SIGMA, TLS protocols adaptation in D2DW scenario of a HAN.
• Prover sends X to the verifier.
• Verifier computes random µ ∈ Zq and sends µ to prover.
• Prover computes response ρ = x+a∗µ and sends ρ to verifier.
• Verifier accepts the proof of commitment if gρ = gx+a∗µ =
(gx) ∗ (ga)µ = XAµ.
Okamoto Identification Scheme: Okamoto IS [15] is based
on DL problem and provides a proof of long-term secret key
possession at the prover. The owner O possess secret keys (a1, a2)
and prove it to the verifier cloud using an ephemeral secret
(x1, x2). Consequently, the verifier cloud returns a challenge µ for
the identity proving owner. Now the prover generates a combined
response (ρ1, ρ2) such that it is computationally hard to compute
(ρ1, ρ2) without possessing the knowledge of (x1, x2).
Common inputs are (p, q, g,G) where p, q are large prime
numbers, g is the generator of order q in group G. Also,
g1, g2 ∈ G where logg1g2 is unknown.
Keygen(pk,sk): The prover O knows the secret key skO =
(a1, a2) with the public key pkO as A = (g1a1 ∗ g2a2). The
protocol Γ(O,C) steps for prover O(skO, pkO) and verifier
C(pkO) are given below:
• Prover choose (x1, x2) ∈ Zq at random in Schnorr’s group and
then compute X = gx1 ∗ gx2 .
• Prover sends X to verifier.
• Verifier computes a random challenge µ∈Zq and send to prover.
• Prover sends ρ1 = x1 +µ∗a1 and ρ2 = x2 +µ∗a2 to verifier.
• Verifier completes the successful identification g1ρ1 ∗ g2ρ2 =
X ∗Aµ.
Pedersens’ Commitment Scheme: The Pedersen scheme [16] is
an unconditionally hiding scheme such that it is secure against
an unbounded adversary. We further illustrate an adaptation
of Pedersens’ bit-commitment protocol in the scope of home
networks where an owner communicates to a third party.
Common inputs are (p, q, g,G) where p, q are large prime
numbers, g is the generator of order q in group G. Also,
g1, g2 ∈ G where logg1g2 is unknown to the prover. The protocol
Γ(O,C) steps are below. The prover O(m) commits a message
m and verifier C(c) verifies the commitment c.
• Commit: Prover randomly selects r ∈ Zq and send c = g1r ∗
g2
m to the verifier.
• Reveal: Verifier receives the (m, r) and output m if g1r ∗g2m =
c.
Comparisons. Schnorr and Okamoto schemes are used for
proving the identity, i.e., the knowledge of the secret key/keys,
but Okamoto scheme is secure in stronger model (active
adversary) at the cost of higher computational complexity
(more exponentiations). Schnorr scheme is secure with passive
adversary observing the protocol messages, i.e., the honest-verifier
model. Both schemes can also be adapted to provide provably
secure digital signatures through Fiat-Shamir transformation [17].
Unfortunately, both Schnorr and Okamoto ISs do not withstand
the ephemeral key leakage attacks such that security of long-term
keys depends on the security of ephemeral keys. For the
immunity against such attacks there exists modified Schnorr
and modified Okamoto that require additional computational
complexity. Interestingly, Pedersen’s commitment scheme is
computationally binding and unconditionally hiding. Therefore,
Pedersen’s scheme is useful as a sub-procedure for the applications
that require security against an unbounded adversary.
Computations at the cloud: For sharing the data with a third
user, proxy re-encryption-based access delegation is applicable
such that a proxy key is generated by the homeowner and
proxy storage node would re-encrypt the data with this key
that could only be decrypted using the secret key of the third
user. The re-encryption key rk (a,b) is generated using a method
Keygen(ska, pka, sk b, pk b), where a is the delegator (e.g.
homeowner) and b is the delegatee (e.g., cloud, law agency or
auditor) sk is the secret key, and pk is the public key. This access
delegation could be either unidirectional or bidirectional meaning
that the data access rights can either be for a specific delegatee or
mutually shared between both the delegator and the delegatee.
Proxy re-encryption converts the ciphered data into
non-transferable ciphertext such that a colluding proxy and the
delegatee cannot transfer access rights to a third party. Therefore,
either the delegator/homeowner can access the data or the
delegatee/cloud can access the data, even if the proxy colludes
with any third party. For example, a proxy re-encryption scheme
based on Elgamal assumes a group G = 〈g〉 of a prime order q.
Also, the long-term public key is computed as gx where x ∈ Zq
is the secret key and g is the group generator. A message m
9Protocols Direct iteration
cost
Certificate
preprocessing
Exponentiation
cost (per party)
Out-of-band
verification
Purpose
ISO-KE [18] 3 rounds Yes 1 No Secure key exchange (D2DW)
SIGMA [19] 3 rounds No 1 No Secure key exchange (D2DW)
TLS [20] >3 rounds Yes 1 No Secure key exchange (D2DW,
D2DWL)
Schnorr IS [10] 4 rounds No 1 No Identification (O2C)
Okamoto IS [16] 3 rounds No 2 No Identification (O2C)
Pedersen
commitment [16]
3 rounds No 2 No Zero-knowledge proof of
knowledge (O2C)
Distance-
bounding [12]
>4 rounds No 1 Yes Authentication (D2DWL)
TABLE 3: Protocol comparison.
is encrypted as ca = ((gx)r,m gr) for a random r ∈ Zq by
access delegator a. Re-encryption keys are generated as rk(a,b)
= y/x mod q ∈ Zq where x and y are the long-term secret
key of party a and b. Now the re-encryption process at the
intermediate proxy node would compute exponentiation by using
re-encryption key y/xmod q on the first part of ciphertext ((gx)r)
as ((gxr)(y/x),m gr)=(gyr,m gr). The access delegatee b then
generate original message m = ca,2ca,1−(1/y).
For computing on encrypted data, many techniques are
proposed in the literate and can be used. For example,
homomorphic encryption allows computations over encrypted data
without decrypting the data. Homomorphic encryption provides
data confidentiality during data aggregation process; however, it is
significantly slow. Here, we briefly explain Pailler’s homomorphic
encryption scheme that provides additive property, such that
product of two encrypted text would be same as addition of
the same text in plaintext. According to Pailler’s homomorphic
encryption scheme:
c = gmrn mod n2
m = (cλ mod n2 − 1)/n µmod n
where c is ciphertext, m is a message in plaintext, r is a random
number r ∈ Zq , (n, g) is a public key and (λ, µ) is a private key.
Overall, neither proxy re-encryption nor homomorphic encryption
scheme requires the secret key for data computation or data access.
Therefore, both of these approaches are useful in providing the
secure computation on encrypted data.
4 PERFORMANCE
Table 3 compares protocols on four different criteria. The second
column represents the direct iteration cost that determines the
communication complexity. Furthermore, online interaction with
the trusted authority for each interaction is time-consuming and
vulnerable to congestion. Therefore, these adapted schemes omit
the need of an online assistance from a trusted-third-party for
every round of authentication. The third column shows whether
the certificate pre-processing is required before the protocol
execution or not? The fourth column shows the computational
complexity, i.e., the required number of exponentiations at each
party during the protocol execution. The fifth column shows
that only distance-bounding approaches require an out-of-band
communication to cross-verify the identity over a wireless channel
by measuring its tentative distance. Finally, the last column
represents the interaction model (D2D or O2C) where these
selected protocols are applicable.
Our implementations have been created using Python 3
with Charm Crypto library [21]. We tested several proof of
concept implementations: (i) on the NIST-approved elliptic curve
prime192v1 [22]; (ii) in Schnorr groups, with 1024-bit safe primes
(e.g., p = 2q + 1). Average computational time for each protocol
has been measured by running 1000 executions of each protocol.
The results are presented in Table 4. The message exchange
does not impose a latency overhead and the message latency is
unrelated to the computations. Thus, each protocol implementation
is created as a single program and the computations of parties are
interweaving.
Protocols EC prime192v1 Integer Group
ISO KE 3.899 ms 7.352 ms
SIGMA 5.134 ms 10.799 ms
Schnorr IS 1.126 ms 2.439 ms
Okamoto IS 1.969 ms 4.154 ms
Pedersen commitment 1.898 ms 2.552 ms
TABLE 4: Execution times for different protocol versions.
5 CONCLUSION
The article studies security protocols for a proximity-based
communication model in HANs. Broadly, the HAN model
consists of device-to-device and owner-to-cloud interactions. The
proximity-based communication model incorporates space and
time as two dimensions. The suitability of these security protocols
is guided by these two dimensions. We provide a comparison
and evaluation for these security protocols. Subsequently, we
find that the computation latency overhead for these protocols
is comparable to wireless signal speed as a fraction of second,
therefore, is readily applicable in HAN settings.
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